Antifederalist No. 24The first essay is taken from the ninth letter of
"Brutus" which appeared in The New-York Journal, January 17, 1788.
. . . . Standing armies are dangerous to the liberties of a people. . . . [If]
necessary, the truth of the position might be confirmed by the history of almost every
nation in the world. A cloud of the most illustrious patriots of every age and country,
where freedom has been enjoyed, might be adduced as witnesses in support of the sentiment.
But I presume it would be useless, to enter into a labored argument, to prove to the
people of America, a position which has so long and so generally been received by them as
a kind of axiom.
Some of the advocates for this new system controvert this sentiment, as they do almost
every other that has been maintained by the best writers on free government. Others,
though they will not expressly deny, that standing armies in times of peace are dangerous,
yet join with these in maintaining, that it is proper the general government should be
vested with the power to do it. I shall now proceed to examine the arguments they adduce
in support of their opinions.
A writer, in favor of this system, treats this objection as a ridiculous one. He supposes
it would be as proper to provide against the introduction of Turkish Janizaries, or
against making the Alcoran a rule of faith.(1)
From the positive, and dogmatic manner, in which this author delivers his opinions, and
answers objections made to his sentiments -- one would conclude, that he was some pedantic
pedagogue who had been accustomed to deliver his dogmas to pupils, who always placed
implicit faith in what he delivered.
But, why is this provision so ridiculous? Because, says this author, it is unnecessary.
But, why is it unnecessary? Because, "the principles and habits, as well as the power
of the Americans are directly opposed to standing armies; and there is as little necessity
to guard against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the establishment of the
Mahometan religion." It is admitted then, that a standing army in time of peace is an
evil. I ask then, why should this government be authorized to do evil? If the principles
and habits of the people of this country are opposed to standing armies in time of peace,
if they do not contribute to the public good, but would endanger the public liberty and
happiness, why should the government be vested with the power? No reason can be given, why
rulers should be authorized to do, what, if done, would oppose the principles and habits
of the people, and endanger the public safety; but there is every reason in the world,
that they should be prohibited from the exercise of such a power. But this author
supposes, that no danger is to be apprehended from the exercise of this power, because if
armies are kept up, it will be by the people themselves, and therefore, to provide against
it would be as absurd as for a man to "pass a law in his family, that no troops
should be quartered in his family by his consent." This reasoning supposes, that the
general government is to be exercised by the people of America themselves. But such an
idea is groundless and absurd. There is surely a distinction between the people and their
rulers, even when the latter are representatives of the former. They certainly are not
identically the same, and it cannot be disputed, but it may and often does happen, that
they do not possess the same sentiments or pursue the same interests. I think I have shown
[in a previous paper] that as this government is constructed, there is little reason to
expect, that the interest of the people and their rulers will be the same.
Besides, if the habits and sentiments of the people of America are to be relied upon, as
the sole security against the encroachment of their rulers, all restrictions in
constitutions are unnecessary; nothing more is requisite, than to declare who shall be
authorized to exercise the powers of government, and about this we need not be very
careful -- for the habits and principles of the people will oppose every abuse of power.
This I suppose to be the sentiments of this author, as it seems to be of many of the
advocates of this new system. An opinion like this, is as directly opposed to the
principles and habits of the people of America, as it is to the sentiments of every writer
of reputation on the science of government, and repugnant to the principles of reason and
The idea that there is no danger of the establishment of a standing army, under the new
constitution, is without foundation.
It is a well known fact, that a number of those who had an agency in producing this
system, and many of those who it is probable will have a principal share in the
administration of the government under it, if it is adopted, are avowedly in favor of
standing armies. It is a language common among them, "That no people can be kept in
order, unless the government have an army to awe them into obedience; it is necessary to
support the dignity of government, to have a military establishment. And there will not be
wanting a variety of plausible reasons to justify the raising one, drawn from the danger
we are in from the Indians on our frontiers, or from the European provinces in our
neighborhood. If to this we add, that an army will afford a decent support, and agreeable
employment to the young men of many families, who are too indolent to follow occupations
that will require care and industry, and too poor to live without doing any business, we
can have little reason to doubt but that we shall have a large standing army as soon as
this government can find money to pay them, and perhaps sooner.
A writer, who is the boast of the advocates of this new constitution, has taken great
pains to show, that this power was proper and necessary to be vested in the general
He sets out with calling in question the candor and integrity of those who advance the
objection; and with insinuating, that it is their intention to mislead the people, by
alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their
The man who reproves another for a fault, should be careful that he himself be not guilty
of it. How far this writer has manifested a spirit of candor, and has pursued fair
reasoning on this subject, the impartial public will judge, when his arguments pass before
them in review.
He first attempts to show, that this objection is futile and disingenuous, because the
power to keep up standing armies, in time of peace, is vested, under the present
government, in the legislature of every state in the union, except two. Now this is so far
from being true, that it is expressly declared by the present articles of confederation,
that no body of forces "Shall be kept up by any state, in time of peace, except such
number only, as in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be
deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such state." Now,
was it candid and ingenuous to endeavor to persuade the public, that the general
government had no other power than your own legislature have on this head; when the truth
is, your legislature have no authority to raise and keep up any focus?
He next tells us, that the power given by this constitution, on this head, is similar to
that which Congress possess under the present confederation. As little ingenuity is
manifested in this representation as in that of the former.
I shall not undertake to inquire whether or not Congress are vested with a power to keep
up a standing army in time of peace; it has been a subject warmly debated in Congress,
more than once, since the peace; and one of the most respectable states in the union, were
so fully convinced that they had no such power, that they expressly instructed their
delegates to enter a solemn protest against it on the journals of Congress, should they
attempt to exercise it.
But should it be admitted that they have the power, there is such a striking dissimilarity
between the restrictions under which the present Congress can exercise it, and that of the
proposed government, that the comparison will serve rather to show the impropriety of
vesting the proposed government with the power, than of justifying it.
It is acknowledged by this writer, that the powers of Congress, under the present
confederation, amount to little more than that of recommending. If they determine to raise
troops, they are obliged to effect it through the authority of the state legislatures.
This will, in the first instance, be a most powerful restraint upon them, against ordering
troops to be raised. But if they should vote an army, contrary to the opinion and wishes
of the people, the legislatures of the respective states would not raise them. Besides,
the present Congress hold their places at the wilt and pleasure of the legislatures of the
states who send them, and no troops can be raised, but by the assent of nine states out of
the thirteen. Compare the power proposed to be lodged in the legislature on this head,
under this constitution, with that vested in the present Congress, and every person of the
least discernment, whose understanding is not totally blinded by prejudice, will perceive,
that they bear no analogy to each other. Under the present confederation, the
representatives of nine states, out of thirteen, must assent to the raising of troops, or
they cannot be levied. Under the proposed constitution, a less number than the
representatives of two states, in the house of representatives, and the representatives of
three states and an half in the senate, with the assent of the president, may raise any
number of troops they please. The present Congress are restrained from an undue exercise
of this power; from this consideration, they know the state legislatures, through whose
authority it must be carried into effect, would not comply with the requisition for the
purpose, [if] it was evidently opposed to the public good. The proposed constitution
authorizes the legislature to carry their determinations into execution, without
intervention of any other body between them and the people. The Congress under the present
form are amenable to, and removable by, the legislatures of the respective states, and are
chosen for one year only. The proposed constitution does not make the members of the
legislature accountable to, or removable by the state legislatures at all; and they are
chosen, the one house for six, and the other for two years; and cannot be removed until
their time of service is expired, let them conduct ever so badly. The public will judge,
from the above comparison, how just a claim this writer has to that candor he asserts to
possess. In the mean time, to convince him, and the advocates for this system, that I
possess some share of candor, I pledge myself to give up all opposition to it, on the head
of standing armies, if the power to raise them be restricted as it is in the present
confederation; and I believe I may safely answer, not only for myself, but for all who
make the objection, that they will [not] be satisfied with less.
1. A citizen of America [Noah Webster], An Examination Into the Leading
Principles of the Federal Constitution proposed by the late Convention held at
Philadelphia. With Answers to the Principal Objections Raised Against the System
(Philadelphia, 1787), reprinted in Ford (ed.), Pamphlets pp. 29-65.